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outlook on life, which results in a remarkable internal social stability of family and community at the expense of personal ease. The greatest Islamist of our time, Carl Brockelmann, once called the Quran "die Heeredienstvorschrift für die Mohammedaner" ("the army regulation book for the Muslims"), and indeed the Quran is not only the condensation of Muslimic religion and philosophy but also the code of laws and the "code of practical regulations" concerning the practical daily life of the average Muslim. From childhood on those "regulations" are drilled and hammered in to the people. The Quran becomes the basis from which everything is judged. The conclusion, that the Muslims do show a strong inclination for doctrinal behavior, is rather justified.

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If we describe the nomad as a logical and realistic individual to whom neurosis and psychosis are in general alien, one certainly should not forget that there has been still room for romance in his life: first and foremost, the Muslimic nomads as well as the Buddhistic nomads (the Mongols) dreamed and still dream of the creation of their own empire in which they are the masters and not the Chinese. The Mongols still mourn for their once powerful and grand empire "where the hoof of the brave horse was the only sound and the roaring and bellowing of camels and cows the only noise" and where the Khan of the Khans, the Khakhan, the Great King, resides in Qaraqorum, the scene of the Great qurultai (constitutional and legislative assembly), ruling the Mongolian tribes and leading the Mongolian armies, in the name and as the representative and vicar of the "Eternal Blue Heaven," the ruler over the universe.

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While in the folklore and literature of the Muslimic nomads the Golden Horde and the Chagatai Empire (Chagatai Ulus), Batur Khan and Timur Lenk (Tamerlane) are oft-repeated subjects, the Mongolian folklore abounds in painting the deeds of Chingis Khan and is excessive in describing the adventurous greatness of the former Mongolian Empire.

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The Buddhistic conception of palingenesis and reincarnation add another romantic feature to the life of the average Mongol and Tibetan and the belief of the Muslim (after having become a hajji, a pilgrim, or even better, a hazze, one who fought as a soldier against the "non-believers") that he would enter the paradise of heaven (or better one of the seven heavens, the seventh, only when he sacrificed his life to Allah in combat), is a deep-rotted romantic conception.

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As we said, the life of the Buddhistic nomad is centered around his tent and his herds, so to speak, the outer sphere of his life, but the inside sphere is absorbed deeply by religion,

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186 between the Moslems and the Lamaists.

As a result of the aforesaid complexity of its geographic basis as well as its intricate historical and political background, the Northwest's population problems are as complicated as its intermingling ethnic composition. For many years, the extreme
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648 northwestern province of Sinkiang suffered from continual conflict between China and Russia, although with the introduction of the Communist regime, the conflict seems at least temporarily resolved.

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198 The development of industrialization in present day China is concentrated in the Northwest. New towns have been emerging in barren mountains and in deserts, such as Shih-yu-ho (near Yü-men), Tu-shan-tzu, (south of Wu-su) and Shih-ho-tzu on the western highway of Urumchi between the towns of Manas (Sui-lai) and Ulan-Wusu. The first two sprang up because of the drilling of promising oil wells in the Chi-lien and Tien-shan mountains.

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816 The China Academy of Sciences announced in December, 1955, that in 1956 a number of new research divisions will be established in the Northwest: a Petroleum Research Bureau in Lanchow of Kansu, an Agro-biology Bureau in Wu-kung, Shensi, an Archaeological Research Bureau in Sian, a Geo-physical Research Bureau and a Veterinary Research Bureau. (Jen-min jih-pao Dec. 16, 1955, NCNA. May 11, 1956).

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[648] Last November, the Northwest Branch of the China Academy of Sciences held a meeting at which, with the assistance of the Russian Korshekov an ambitious plan was formulated for the economic development of the Northwest in the coming fifteen years, with emphasis on survey of natural resources, study of petroleum and rare metals, exploitation of non-ferrous metals, agronomy, soil science and animal husbandry. In these
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[873] discussions, the professors of three schools of higher education, the Northwest University, the Northwest Industrial College, and the Northwest Agricultural College, took an active part. (Kuang-ming jih-pao Dec. 13, 1955; NCNA. May 11, 1956).

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161 B. General Distribution and Regional Characteristics.

The Northwest Region has an average density of 28.6 persons per square mile, as compared with the average density of 160 per square miles for the whole country. It has the smallest number in population among all the major regions of China, as the following shows:

Major Regions	Population (1953 Census)
North China	55,749,000
Northeast China	41,732,000
East China	162,682,000
Central and South Chin	176,331,000

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631 political and military reasons. After the last British Consulate
131 of Kashgar was closed, the curtain has become even more
668 impenetrable there than in any other part of China. Not even
172 Chinese are allowed to travel into Sinkiang without special
(648) permits.

N F. Northwest As An Outlet for Chinese Overpopulation
167 The Northwest Region has been long regarded by the Chinese
• 185 as one of the major outlet areas for China's overpopulation. Once the plans to conserve water and soil are completed - especially along the Yellow River in Shensi and Kansu - arable land will be considerably extended. But water and soil conservancy will involve a lot of problems before the land is actually made productive - not to mention that its sustaining capacity is limited. Therefore the Northwest as an outlet for China's overpopulation is tentative and should only be regarded as a partial and temporary solution.

N 1. Extension of Arable Land by Irrigation and Soil Conservancy
311 According to plan the irrigated area in the mid-Yellow River
185 Basin will grow from 12,717,000 acres at present to some 19,105,000 acres. Agricultural output in the irrigated area will more than double. Annual grain output will increase by 6,741,000 long tons and cotton by 590,000 long gons. The loess regions with their barren mountains and desolate gullies covering 143,000 square miles, will become a land of plenty. Most of the land for irrigation development under the project will be in the provinces of Shensi and Kansu. ("China's Sorrow" Will Be No More - The Taming and Exploiting of the Yellow River, by Li Jui, People's China, August 6, 1955, p. 9-15).

S The area of arable land in Sinkiang has also been extended,
311 but it is not easy to ascertain by how much or by what means.
185 In 1953 it had reached twenty million mou, 4,100,000 more than in 1949 (PD. August 28, 1955); in 1954 more than 5,000,000 mou above 1949, i.e. a total of 21 million mou (KM. September 15, 1955; by 1955 22 million mou (PD. October 31, 1955).

According to the above figures, the increase between 1949 and 1955 would be six million mou. But there appear some discrepancies with other information. The difficulty is that the 1950 data for the extension of arable land in Sinkiang was not 16 million but 18.195 million mou (Newspaper Reading Handbook, Hankow, p. 25, 1950). Thus if the present data are reliable, the 1949-55 increase would be three million mou instead of six million, of which 1,100,000 mou are due to the labor of the Army Agrarian Production Troops.

S According to official reports, in 1953, 1.6 million tons of
433 food stuffs were produced in Sinkiang (PD. August 28, 1955). About the production in 1954, it is known that there was an

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433 Under land reform in Sinkiang, on the average, 2.5 mou were
S distributed per person. (PD. August 28, 1954). According to
[161] the 1953 census - Sinkiang has a population of 4,873,608.
That means the average acreage per head would about 4.5
mou instead of 2.5. Taking this as a basis, the estimated
110,000,000 mou of possibly extended land for cultivation
can accommodate nearly another fifty million people; that
S will be ten times larger than its present population.

N Land reclamation by the development of irrigation in
311 Chinghai province and former Ninghsia along the Kansu
312 Corridor is not as promising as in Sinkiang and the mid-
• 185 Yellow River drainage area of Shensi and Kansu, because
of the limited amount of snow over the nearby high mountains.
Another three million people (twice its present population)
would be the most that Chinahai could support by land reclamation for agriculture and pastoral development.

Summing up all the possibilities, an approximate total of another fifty-five million people which is nearly one and a half times the amount of its present total population can be supported at the present standard of living by the development of irrigation in land reclamation in the whole Northwest Region
N of China. According to the 1953 Census, the Northwest has
[161] a total population of 35,359,525 with an annual natural increase at a rate of twenty per thousand as the Chinese Communists claim. That means an addition of more than 700,000 people are added by natural increase each year. In approximately seventy years, another fifty-five million people will be added to its present population by natural increase only. But in view of an annual natural increase of nearly twelve million for the whole population of China, the Northwest can be used as a reservoir for the nation for a period of only four years. Therefore the Northwest is extremely limited as a population outlet for China. And the conversion of 110 million mou into arable land in Sinkiang is itself a gigantic task to fulfill; and conservancy of soil and water can hardly cope with the natural increase in population. Land reclamation in the Northwest should be regarded as a means of improving the living standards of the people rather than as an outlet for any further increase of the population.

SN 795 62] 793 /Chinese Moslems/

The Chinese Moslem community differs from the Turkic Moslem community mainly in the organization of the community around the mosque and in the peculiar position the ahung holds in the community. The ahung holds the central position in both the religious and the social life. In principle, the Islamic community has no professional priests, but in China the ahung has actually taken the place of one. The Imam, whose office is important in Western Asia and Eastern Turkestan, where he has leadership in religious life, has lost his pre-eminent position in China. So has the Muazzin (the one who calls people for prayer) and the Mufti (the teacher of law). At present these positions have been practically abolished. Those who hold the title have no particular importance in the community. These titles are inherited and are not conferred by virtue of any knowledge of Islamic affairs. The ahung is the only real Moslem scholar SN [554] in the Chinese Moslem community. He is nominated to this position by virtue of his knowledge of the details and philosophy of the religion. He trains students, the Khalifa, to become the future ahungs and to continue to maintain Islamic life in China.

SN G. Chinese Moslem Sects

SN 795 185 [175] After the pilgrims had established some contact with the rest of the Moslem world, there were attempts, many of them springing in the Northwest, to reform Islam in China. The first well-known attempt of this sort was made by Muhammad Amin, known in China as Ma Ning-hsia, who in 1781 appeared among the Salars and introduced some reforms concerning the rituals of Islam, correcting some of the practices which seemed not to be in accordance with those he had observed in Mecca.

However, of all the most notoriously successful is the sect of Ma Hua-lung, the hsin-chiao or the new doctrine, as contrasted with the traditional religion practiced by the Chinese Moslems, Lao-chiao or the old doctrine.

SN 795 792 185 The new sect is to be set apart from the rest of Islam in China. In spite of the Islamic Chinese tradition regarding religious leaders, their being chosen by the community to serve it, and known only to their adherents, Ma Hua-lung's name was known far beyond his immediate followers. To some he was a prophet, and others detested him as an impostor.

The nature of Ma Hua-lung's teachings still remains somewhat of a mystery. There is a tendency to regard them as endorsements of Shi'ism, or perhaps as an unusually bold representation of Sufism (mysticism in Islam). However, the notices of D'Ollone show that actually they are genuinely Sunni in character and not a variety of the mystical philosophy widely diffused throughout Central Asia. Ma Hua-lung was regarded as an incarnation of the Spirit—a sheng jen (holy man, prophet)

S N 795 792 185 equal to or even higher than Muhammad himself. Most of his followers were uneducated. They believed that he had divine revelations since, without instruction, he had answers to all questions and appeared to know many things. As the founder of a new sect, he had to prescribe certain external forms by which his adherents might be distinguished from others. The differences he ordered are best described by W. T. Chan in the following passage:

"The New Sect insists that a certain chapter of the Koran should be recited once only instead of three times as held by the Old Sect, that at prayer clasped hands should be raised once instead of twice, that after a meal there is no need to raise clasped hands in greeting, and that in singing the praise of Allah the voice should be low instead of high. With reference to religious service, the New Sect does not allow any substituting for an ahung in preaching, whereas the Old Sect permits such an arrangement. The two sects also disagree on the basis for calculating the period of fasting, with the New Sect adhering strictly to the Arabic method and the Old Sect following the Chinese lunar Calendar. The New Sect believes that at funerals the mourners should take off their shoes, and stand on a mat while praying for the dead, whereas the Old Sect holds fast to the tradition of standing on the ground with the shoes on. The New Sect also directs that the corpse be laid on the ground, whereas the Old Sect insists on its being on a platform. There is also a disagreement as to whether there should be an honoraria for preachers. In short, the New Sect insists on returning to Islamic traditions, but the Old Sect prefers to keep the customs that have developed in China through the centuries." (Religious Trends in Moslem China, p. 193.)

S N 795 792 [669] Being partly dedicated to ideas of forming a Moslem state in the Northwest, independent of China proper, Ma Hua-lung played a very important role in the Moslem rebellion during the nineteenth century.

S N [578] After the death of Ma Hua-lung, friction developed in his sect. His son-in-law, Ma Ta-hsi, and his grandson, Ma Hi-hsi, fought each other for the sacred inheritance. Ma Ta-hsi had the advantage of numbers and his place of residence, Cha-ku, became an important religious center.

S N 795 Chang distinguished another sect existing in the Northwest, which he identifies as the New New Sect. Unfortunately there is not much evidence as to its nature. He also mentions a Sufi order in the Northwest called Che-ho-yeh (corruption of Jahrivah). The latter is described as "having an abbot, like the Buddhist lama. It is heavily superstitious and is generally despised by other schools." D'Ollone and Hartmann, however, identify this sect as that of Ma Hua-lung, the name Jahriva

by the laymen. Temples frequently maintain free hostels for travellers, and one can count on any layman to provide food, shelter, road guidance, and any kind of help to needy passers-by. It is even customary for a Mongol to leave food in front of his tent during the time he is on an outing. This hospitality is extended to destitutes and refugees also, by Mongols as well as Tibetans, irrespective of the creed of the receiver.

IV. Welfare Efforts Under the Republic, Particularly Under the National Government

With the coming of the Chinese Republic, the realization grew that welfare was a public matter. Although it took time until the rudiments of an organization were set up to implement this realization, the government at best acted to the limits of its possibilities to bring relief in the case of natural catastrophes. During the great famine in the Northwest, caused by protracted droughts and earthquakes in 1928/29, the government organized a special commission to handle relief. The relief work of this commission was financed partly by fixed government grants, special loans and by solicited special contributions from Chinese cities, provinces and private organizations and individuals as well as by organizing a rather successful drive for funds abroad. The role played by the China Famine Relief Commission in this as well as in similar instances is discussed in the Social Welfare Section of the General Handbook.

The realization grew however that with regard to natural disasters, prevention work might be of greater importance than relief. One of the projects that grew out of this realization might be mentioned here, the Wei-pei irrigation project in Shensi. This project was conceived jointly by the Shensi provincial authorities and the China International Famine Relief Commission in the twenties. Actual work commenced in December 1930 and was completed in June 1932. Ninety thousand acres of land have been reclaimed b this combined conservancy and irrigation project. The maintenance of the system was later taken over by the National Economic Council.

In the late thirties this Council was particularly active in irrigation and reclamation schemes in the Northwest. It was responsible for the sponsoring or subsidizing of several large-scale projects in Shensi, Kansu and Ninghsia Provinces.

Unfortunately, there is very little information available on the efforts on the part of the Chinese administration in the field of public welfare in the Northwest, both under the National Government and under the present Communist regime. From the little material we have the general impression is that the local efforts of the Moslem community encompass most of the work done in public welfare.

159 and the so-called Four Ma, all of Moslem religion. Ma Hung-
[614] k'ui is one of them. His father, Ma Fu-hsiang (literary name, Yun-t'ing), served in the early years of the Republic as the High Commissioner for Chinghai, commander of the Guards Division for Altai, and later in the second year of the Republic, 1913, the Commission of the Guards Division for Ninghsia.

[669] When the Revolution of 1911 broke out, Ma Hung-k'uei was studying at the military school in Lanchou, Kansu. He played a small part in the revolution by mobilizing the students of the school and trying, unsuccessfully, to take over some strategic points in the city.

159 He started his military career when he followed his father to
701 Ninghsia as a batallion leader. In 1921, when his father was transferred to be the garrison commander of Suiyuan, he was promoted as commanding officer of the Fifth Mixed Brigade. During the war between Chang Tso-lin of Manchuria and Wu P'ei-fu of Chihli (Hopei) Province, he was appointed as the commander of the cavalry in Jehol, Chahar and Suiyuan Provinces. After the war was over, he followed the victorious General Feng Yu-hsiang to Peking. In 1926, when the Northern Expedition started, he followed General Feng again, taking part in the expedition. At this time his troop was reorganized into the Fourth Army of the First Army Group, and he became the commander of the Fourth Army. In 1928, he fought the war in North China and his troops suffered a great loss. When the situation was settled, he regrouped his troops into the 17th Division, and was put in charge of suppressing the bandits in the western part
[669] of Shantung Province. In April, 1929, when General Feng Yu-hsiang revolted against the Nationalist Government headed by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, Ma remained loyal to the Nationalist Government. His troops were again reorganized into the 11th Army. In 1930, his army was enlarged into the 15th Army Group and was in charge of patrolling the Lung-hai and Tientsin-Pukou Railway lines. In the winter of 1932 he was ordered to go to Ninghsia, and on January 1, 1933, he was appointed governor of Ninghsia.

159 When Ma Hung-k'ui took over the administration in 1933, the
• 185 province of Ninghsia was in a deplorable situation, suffering
656 from floods and the ravages of Ma Chung-ying. To restore peace and prosperity to the people, Ma Hung-k'uei first mopped
[579] up the remnants of the bandits in his province. He introduced the Pao-chia system by which the people were organized to insure against the recurrence of banditry. Third, he adopted measures to put a gradual end to the planting and smoking of opium. Fourth, he stabilized the currency within Ninghsia and improved the taxation system. Simultaneously, he followed the policies of improving land administration, encouraging

afforestation, construction and repair of roads, and introducing the irrigation system. During the fifteen years of his administration, 1933-1948, Ninghsia Province changed from a land of devastation to a land of peace and normalcy, achieved by ruthless regimentation.

When the war between Japan and China broke out in 1937, Ma Hung-k'uei volunteered to fight the enemy. Because of the importance of the Northwest, and because of the importance of Ninghsia as the gateway to the Northwest, he was ordered by the Central Government to stay in Ninghsia to guard that strategic area against Communist infiltration. From 1937-1945, however, Ninghsia became a part of the Eighth War Area, and Ma was appointed as the deputy commander-in-chief. When the war against Japan was brought to an end in 1945, he was appointed deputy director of the Northwest Headquarters of the president. When all-out fighting started between the Nationalists and the Communists, he was given the post of deputy Director of Military and Political Affairs of the Northwest Area. In July 1949, when the Communist troops began to push their way to the Northwest, he joined Ma Pu-feng, another member of the famous Ma clan, then Director of Military and Political Affairs of the Northwest Area, to set up defense lines. But the victorious forces of the Communists broke through all these lines and pushed their way to the eastern and southern parts of Kansu Province. The two Ma flew to Canton, the provisional capital, to see Vice-President General Li Tsung-jen for new instructions. It was decided to concentrate the troops to defend Lanchou. On August 25, 1949, when the troops of Ma Hung-k'uei were still some eighty miles away from Lanchou, the Communist troops had already reached that city. By the middle of September, 1949, the whole Northwest, including Kansu, Ninghsia and Chinghai, was taken over by the Communists.

In 1949 when the Nationalist Government took up the defense of Kansu Province, Ma was appointed concurrently as governor of Kansu. His administrative record in Kansu was short-lived. The Communists took over the whole Northwest by September, 1949. When the Nationalist Government retreated to Taiwan, both the military and political life of Ma Hung-k'uei came to an end. He entered the United States and lived a life of retirement in San Francisco.

Ma Hung-pin (1883-)

Another of the Four Ma who once ruled the Northwest of modern China, Ma Hung-pin is a cousin of Ma Hung-k'uei, governor of Ninghsia Province from 1933-1948 and governor of Kansu Province from 1948-50. Together with Ma Pu-fang and Ma Pu-ch'ing of Chinghai Province, they were usually called the "Four Ma of Islam" in the Northwest.

159 under the Ma family in Chinghai Province started with their
614 father, Ma Lin, who devoted his efforts toward the promotion
635 of education within the province. After Ma Lin died, his brother,
Ma Ch'i, took over the administration. But when the war with
[648] Japan began in 1937, Ma Pu-fang was given the position of governor of Chinghai, and at the same time he shouldered the tasks of leading the Kuomintang and commanding the troops within that province.

159 Ma Pu-fang was a career army officer. He started as a
[70] commanding officer of a batallion, and gradually climbed up to the post of commander of an army. When his uncle, Ma Ch'i,
[635] was governor of Chinghai before the Sino-Japanese War, he became a member of the provincial government. When he finally took over the administrative job in Chinghai in 1937, he was one of the youngest governors in China.

159 For more than thirteen years, 1937-1950, he held the posi-
635 tion of governorship. During his administration, particularly
185 during the war years, he aimed at the following six main tasks: First, he organized the Pao-chia system not only among the Chinese and Moslems, but also among the Mongols and Tibetans in his province. Second, he trained the local militia for the
[206] purpose of maintaining local order. Third, he was very strict
[811] in carrying out the policy of elimination of opium. Fourth, he conducted the movement of compulsory education aiming at the total elimination of illiteracy within Chinghai. As a result of his policy, in a single year more than a hundred thousand people learned to read. In addition, there were 8 middle normal schools, 131 primary schools and 805 grade schools in that
[499] province. The fifth task was to construct highways, and during his administration, more than two thousand kilometers of highways were constructed. The sixth point was afforestation. Every person was compelled to plant five to ten trees a year, and as a result, more than seven million trees had been planted during those war years.

159 Being a Moslem himself and realizing the complexity of
771 religions in Chinghai, Ma Pu-fang was cautious in his handling
64 of different religious groups. On the whole he worked toward
635 religious harmony, and his policy was one of equal treatment toward all tribes. He chose his personnel regardless of religion or race, on the basis of capacity and personality. Thus he was generally trusted by all religious groups in his province.

159 When the Communists began their campaign in 1949, they
669 pushed their way to the Northwest. Ma Pu-fang was appointed director of the Administrative Headquarters of the Northwest, succeeding General Chang Chih-chung. Joining forces with Ma Hung-k'uei, he directed the defense of the Northwest. Unfortunately, all his attempts failed and by October, 1949, the

159 Ch'ilien and Chishih Mountains. In the Tsaidam River valley,
631 comprised of six districts, there were nearly a hundred thou-
635 sand Mongols, who were Buddhists by religion and nomads economically, and twenty-five thousand Kazakhs, with some Moslems and Chinese. When Ma Pu-ch'ing took over this re-
• [185] gion he directed his reclamation program along the following lines: to inspire patriotism among the border peoples, to promote education, to develop the uncultivated lands by settlements of people, and to increase production by encouraging industrial programs, to improve the transportation facilities to ship needed goods to the interior, and finally to open mines in that region for the needs of both the border area and the interior.

159 His public life, like that of his younger brother, was finally
669 ended by the arrival of the Communists. When the Northwest was lost to the People's Liberation Army, he fled from Chinghai and followed the Nationalist Government to Formosa.

159 Ma T'eng-ai
631 Background and dates unknown. 1953-, member of the North-
635 west Administrative Council and vice-chairman of the People's Government of Ninghsia Province until 1954.

159 Ma Wen-jui: Communist Party member
*668 A native of Shensi Province. He had served as secretary to
631 the Communist Headquarters in eastern Kansu under the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Government. When the Military and Administrative Council for the Northwest was formed in 1950, he was appointed as a member of that council, in which he was chairman of the People's Supervisory Commission and a member in the Political and Legal Commission, positions which he retained when the council was reorganized as the Northwest Administrative Council in 1953. In the party, he has been since 1950, director of the Department of Organization and director of the Commission on Women's Work in the Northwest Bureau of the CCP. In 1955, he was transferred to Peking as Minister of Labor.

159 The main responsibility of Ma Wen-jui was to push the United
*668 Front work in the Northwest in 1950. His Department of Organization was active, months before the formation of the MAC and the People's Governments, in the induction of former Nationalist Government functionaries and students into the governments of the Communists. Later, he was responsible for pushing the ideological reforms of the cadres and the purges in 1952, and the job of Communist Party expansion in the Northwest.

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AGRICULTURE AND LIVESTOCK

I. The Pre-Communist Period

A. Introduction

Since the Chinese Communist Party came to power, its interest in the Northwest, as an area for economic development, has increased. The Communists feel that this vast region of 1,232,078 square miles, which is roughly one-third of the total area of China (3,657,765 square miles), offers unlimited opportunities for economic development. They claim that vast mineral deposits exist, that agriculture can be greatly expanded, and that the Northwest might serve as an outlet for some of the heavily populated sections of China Proper. Of China's total population of 582,605,000 million people, only 35,360,000 reside in the Northwest (Shensi: 15,881,000; Kansu and Ninghsia: 12,928,000; Chinghai: 1,677,000; and Sinkiang: 6,874,000). These figures are from the 1953 census report.

Since 1949, the Communists have begun to develop this area as rapidly as their limited capital and technological resources permit. Though the development of agriculture is only one aspect of their program, it is the foundation on which Communist planning in the Northwest rests.

B. Sinkiang

1. The geographical setting

Sinkiang is enclosed on the north, south, and west by mighty mountain masses and on the eastern side by wide stretches of barren plateau and is bisected by the lofty Tienshan, or Heavenly Mountains, which rise to heights of 23,000 feet and extend across the province from west to east, dividing the region into two unequal parts. The southern area, two-thirds of the whole, is the Tarim Basin, the land of oases and deserts. The northern part is Dsungaria, traditionally the land of the nomads. The total area of the province is about 600,000 square miles, or twice the size of Texas.

In the Tarim Basin, named from the east flowing river of the same name, is one of the world's driest deserts, the Takla Makan, which at its lowest point is actually below sea level. Vegetation is almost non-existent, so that nomadism is impossible except on a few alluvial fans where water lies near enough to the surface to support grass. The average rainfall is less than four inches a year. Water comes from the mountains which fringe the desert on the north, west and south. From the melting upland snows and glaciers, rivers cut their way down to the central oval desert. Where each river leaves the foothills, men dig canals to spread the water out in a fan, forming an oasis, so that the edge of the desert along the foot of the mountains is dotted by a series of oases.

313 mostly in Kansu. In 1945, large-scale afforestation projects were
[185] undertaken by the provincial government, especially in Ninghsia. The exceptional fact about these projects was that the young seedlings were properly cared for and did not die as so frequently occurred in other afforestation schemes. The Ninghsia projects were, of course, taken over by the Chinese Communists.

311 In the loess plateau region, between the great wall and the
139 mountains, and between the Tibetan Highlands on the West and the Yellow plain to the East, there is almost no forest cover.
313 Forests are found only in the more inaccessible areas or in temple groves. Their disappearance is related partly to needs for lumber but also to the introduction of new crops, such as corn and Irish potatoes, which will grow on the upper slopes. Many hills
[241] were burned over in order to clear the land for a cultivation
[134] which could last for only a few years until erosion swept away the last trace of soil.

5. The border region

*175 In 1937, the Chinese Communists occupied the northern portion
*668 of Shensi as well as the fringe areas of Chinghai, Kansu, and
433 Ninghsia. This region was regarded as the Shensi, Kansu, Ninghsia, Chinghai border region and was developed by the Communists
[437] into a relatively self-sufficient area. When they were able, they exchanged surpluses such as oil, salt, herbs, skin and wool for articles which they could not as yet produce in sufficient quantity.

*175 The Communists carried out land reform as soon as they were
*668 fully entrenched in power. Large land holdings were cut up and
[423] parcelled out to peasants with little or no land. Rents and interest rates were reduced, efforts were made to extend cultivation, increase the number of draft animals, and develop labor cooperation beyond family circles.

*175 In a study by Yung-ying Hsü, issued by the Institute of Pacific
*668 Relations, there is a summary of the economy and military status
433 of this region. There are numerous statistics to indicate increases in production of certain crops. These are the only available statistics we have for the region during this period, and the figures seem to indicate that despite the excessive expenditures for the maintenance of an army and guerilla forces as well as a governing body and administration, progress was made in raising the level of agriculture. However, by 1943, trade figures for the region indicate an imbalance of payments and a drain of currency from the region indicating that increasing military commitments were absorbing the created wealth of the region.

13 D. Conclusion

241 We may sum up the obstacles to agricultural development as
311 follows: geographic and climatic problems are the most serious. The amount of cultivable land that can be reclaimed and used for

241 433 Such costs could be avoided if intensive farming measures were emphasized, internal markets developed, and these in turn linked to China through a network of transport.

II. The Communist Period

241 * 668 ### A. General Outline of Communist Policy for Agriculture in the Northwest

The pattern of Chinese Communist agricultural policy for this region is similar to what has emerged in China. The only differences have been in the timing and pace of reform policies which stem from the varying political, economic, and geographic conditions of the Northwest.

When the People's Liberation Army had occupied the Northwest, [423] land reform on a regional scale commenced. By 1951 land reform was completed in areas with an agricultural population of seven million; rents were reduced in areas with an agricultural population of ten million. (Current Background, No. 141, November 27, 1951. General Chang Chih-chung on Development in the Northwest. p. 14.) Immediately upon completion of the land 241 * 668 474 476 433 reform, concerted efforts were launched to increase the agricultural and livestock production of the Northwest through cooperativization; by establishing mutual aid teams and then combining these into agricultural producer cooperatives where land, farm implements, and livestock are pooled. The ultimate objective of the Chinese Communists is to cooperativize all agriculture in the Northwest, and through a network of such cooperatives, concentrate on raising productivity by expanding cultivation, sowing with better types of seeds, and using more advanced tools and farming methods. Cooperativization is taking place in villages and oases, and steps have been taken to establish state farms in regions where there are large tracts of reclaimed land.

241 311 • 185 * 668 Survey teams were sent out to determine what land might be reclaimed and cultivated. Upon the estimates of these teams, units of the army went out to reclaim the land. Because most of the land surveyed was desert, the construction and extension of irrigation works, the building of reservoirs, the setting up of irrigation pumps to pump the water through newly-dug canals over the desert had to begin at almost the same time.

311 185 * 668 288 439 [248] Some progress has been made in extending cultivation and planting cotton by reclaiming waste land. Communist planning is ambitious and in future five year plans, they intend to make the province of Shensi a textile processing area to which Sinkiang and other areas in the Northwest will ship their cotton. In this way, it is hoped to ultimately make the entire region self-sufficient in textile production. Textile factories are being erected in Sinkiang too for the purpose of processing cotton produced there, and it is already reported that some cotton cloth is being shipped to the U.S.S.R.

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668 training takes time before these technicians, accountants, etc.,
241 can go out and organize co-ops, operate them efficiently, and train other native cadres. The 1955 plan calls for the training of 600 technical cadres for the "Centers for Promoting Agricultural Techniques," for the training of 500 in-office cadres by rotation, and for the training of 4,190 accountants and 5,337 technicians for agricultural producer cooperatives.

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668 An additional problem (which will be mentioned at this point
659 rather than repeated when each province of the Northwest is dis-
736 cussed) concerns the soldiers' dependents in the region and the
474 plight of discharged army personnel. The State has been particu-
729 larly upset by the lack of participation of these groups in coopera-
[464] tivization and special attention is now being devoted to utilize this source of manpower. Since dependents of servicement are given certain State stipends, in food, many of them feel that by joining a cooperative they will be deprived of this compensation. Because 1955 was a critical year in the Five Year Plan, the pace of erecting new co-ops and consolidating the older ones has been increased. Now many of the dependents and demobilized soldiers who were organized in these co-ops have backed out of them and many of these co-ops have, therefore, never been consolidated. Another problem in the co-ops is that the members do not want partly disabled or female workers, and, on the other hand, many dependents feel that the State should provide for them. (No. 1004, March 10, 1955, Supplements. "Actively Organizing Servicemen's Dependents for Mutual Aid and Co-op Work." U.S. Consulate General. Survey of China Mainland Press.) The proper allocation of labor in the Northwest remains a critical problem.

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* 175 2. Chinghai
* 668 By December, 1954, 575 agricultural producer co-ops had
474 been formed, and this constituted 9.12 per cent of all households.
452 The number of mutual aid co-ops was not given but it was reported
[476] that 69.7 per cent of all households had been cooperativized to some extent. There were also 159 supply and marketing coopera-tives, 148 credit cooperatives, and 12 handicraft producer co-ops. Long term low interest loans have been extended to poor peasants to encourage them to join farming co-ops. The first allocation totalled over 138 million yuan (U.S. $5,598). The interest rate is 0.4 per cent monthly and the repayment period is spread over five years. Besides these individual loans to poor peasants, there have been additional ones to enable the peasants to build small water conservancy works and buy new types of farm tools. All totalled, state loans amounted to more than 750 million yuan (U.S. $30,426) for 1955. (Far Eastern Economic Review. Dec. 1, 1955. pp. 686-87.)

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* 668 In a provincial report by Chan Kuo-sheng, Secretary General
241 of the Chinghai Provincial People's Government, on work
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conditions in 1954 and tasks for 1955, it was stated that 2,000 modern plows were now in use, and 67,245 mou (10,221 acres) of dry fields have been converted into water fields, while adequate water supply has also been made available to 28,597 mou (4,347 acres) of original water fields. It was planned to have 746 agricultural producer co-ops in operation in 1955, with an area of 5,115,000 mou (777,480 acres) to be sowed with a planned output for the province of 853,350,948 carries (42,337,207 bushels). An area of 500,000 mou (76,000 acres) is to be sown for oil bearing crops with a planned output of 10 million catties (24,137 metric tons). There is so little data for the pre-Communist and Communist period that it is impossible to construct a table. The only comparison that can be made is in oil seed bearing crops (and livestock which follows). The pre-Communist figures give an average of 21,000 metric tons for the years 1931-1939. Since it is planned to increase output to 24,137 metric tons, this will mean an increase of 3,137 metric tons; not a very significant increase.

In Chinghai there is a population of over one million; sixty per cent belong to the Tibetan, Mongolian, and Hui minority nationalities. The Communists reported that the province's seven million head of livestock in 1951 was increased to over twelve million in 1954 and it is planned that 20 million will be raised by 1957. (Pre-war and war year statistics list the total livestock at little over one million. Communists claims of sevenfold and twelvefold increases in this case, ought to be accepted with reservations. However, because the base year (one million) is so low, it is possible to have rapid increases of a relatively large magnitude.) The People's Government issued loans to husbandmen engaged in animal husbandry totalling 6,555,000,000 yuan (U.S. $266,365) in 1954. Steps were taken in cutting and storing grass for winter, repairing sheds and enclosures, and building winter and spring shelters to protect livestock during the cold season. It was also reported that in 1954, goals in planned purchases of cattle and sheep were achieved, and this produced definite contributions in support of the industrial construction of the State. At the same time, these activities served to educate the people in patriotism and mutual aid.

Tasks for the future were to continue to raise agricultural production based on the mutual aid and producer co-ops and to develop supply and marketing co-ops, credit co-ops, and arrange for markets in rural areas to promote interflow of supplies and planned purchase and planned supply of food. Care was to be taken to preserve livestock and to continue afforestation schemes. It was reported that within the province some 38,900 mou (5,913 acres) had been afforestated in 1954 and the number of fires greatly reduced.

668 241 185 175 Because Chinghai is a dry region and irrigation works are needed the Communists planned for 5,000 hectares (12,355 acres) of land to be brought under cultivation in 1955. Five teams of irrigation workers arrived at selected places to help extend the area of irrigated land. The plan for 1955 involved improving the irrigation canals, servicing 4,600 hectares (11,367 acres), and the setting up of two pumping stations. The Communists claimed that by the end of 1954, fifty per cent more land was irrigated than before the "liberation."

668 185 Chinghai's problems are similar to those that prevail in Sinkiang. Production plans are not fulfilled, especially those plans for oil bearing crops and the improvement of sheep breeds. This is supposed to reflect a lack of responsibility on the part of the cadres toward the State's plans but the real problem undoubtedly lies with the difficulties of intricate planning and the insufficient number of trained, skilled cadres. Excessive spending and waste were attacked and these were blamed on the weakness of ideological leadership. The report by Chang Kuo-sheng goes so far as to say that workers are honest and loyal but it is the cadres who still retain "bourgeois" thoughts, and are to blame. Thus, it appears that the peasants are not being criticized for planning and organizational defects for fear of antagonizing and isolating many of them from Communist rural organizations.

668 185 241 It seems fairly self-evident that as the work of planning in the agricultural areas becomes more complicated and detailed in nature, the number of technicians will have to be increased. In addition to being skillful accountants, agro-technicians, etc., they will have to be ideologically trained so as to faithfully carry out the State's plans. The Communists, then, have a twofold job: to train members of the various nationalities to be technicians and at the same time to turn them into good Communists. The speed at which they are attempting to turn out a large number may mean poorly trained technicians. This will complicate and hinder agricultural planning even more.

668 578 Hsijaochiatso, the Vice-Governor of Chinghai, delivered a speech on July 22, 1955, to the National People's Congress on the progress made in Chinghai, which differed greatly in content from other speeches given by nationality leaders of the various frontier regions of China. While most of the other speeches to the National People's Congress dealt with concrete advancements made in the nationality areas, Vice-Governor Hsijaochiatso's report was devoted largely to acts of sabotage and resistance to socialization in Chinghai. A quotation will serve to point this out. "Because we are carrying out our construction plans very satisfactorily, the enemy both within and without the country has resorted to mad acts of sabotage in various forms. Very recently, in some pastoral areas, the rumor spread to the effect that the organization of cooperatives in pastoral areas is a disguised form

*668 231 The number of large domestic animals increased to over 2,586,000, that of sheep (including goats) to over 3,003,500 and that of pigs to over 1,825,000. There are four state livestock farms. Compared to pre-war figures, domestic animals and pigs increased twofold while sheep increased nearly twelvefold.

*668 313 *175 In addition, a campaign for afforestation and forest protection was launched so that in northern Shensi by the end of 1954, some 280,000 mou (42,560 acres) had been afforestated by the State. During 1954, 206,900 mou (31,449 acres) were afforested, nurseries occupied 4,900 mou (754 acres), 856,100 mou (130,127 acres) of wooded wilderness were surveyed, and new forest developments were carried out on 61,500 mou (9,348 acres).

*668 • 185 433 [240] [231] By 1955 it is planned to increase the grain acreage so that it will be 70,150,000 mou (10,662,800 acres) and the total output 1,970,000 piculs (13,002 tons). Oil bearing crops will be increased and plans to develop animal husbandry are underway so that there will be 2,790,000 large domestic animals, 2,008,000 pigs, and 3,515,000 goats and sheep to relieve the shortage of meat and dairy products in the markets. In 1955, the area to be [313] afforested will be 280,000 mou (42,424 acres) and 7,000 mou (1,064 acres) will be used for nurseries. Tea plantations will be strengthened and growing of vegetables in the suburbs of cities will be promoted. All this will be accomplished by increasing *668 the pace of cooperativization for 1955; seventy-five per cent of 185 all households will be cooperativized and agricultural producer [474] co-ops will total 21,000. A spring campaign will be launched also [241] to enlarge the sowing area and improve stock breeding, and efforts will be made to strengthen leadership over production in hilly regions; technical reforms will be continued and stepped up. Finally, satisfactory supplies of consumer and producer goods will be given to the peasant. The latter (producer goods) include farm implements, fertilizers, draft animals, insecticides, spraying equipment and good seeds.

Some of the defects that crop up in Shensi are particularly serious since it is one of the most advanced provinces in the Northwest, from the standpoint of the large number of co-ops. The following obstacles have arisen to obstruct the campaign to step up cooperativization. So-called rural "capitalist forces" and [578] rumors fabricated by counter-revolutionary elements have brought uneasiness to the middle peasants. Consequently, peasants have sold or slaughtered their farm animals, felled trees, rushed to buy consumer goods, squandered their money. This state of affairs is supposed to have resulted because the correct policy of solidifying poor and middle peasants has not been carried out. Commandism among the cadres is reported to prevail and this has had the over-all result of slowing down cooperativization.

ooo So-called counter-revolutionary elements were reported to

668 policies. Such resistance is revealed in instances where wheat
659 fields have been enlarged at the expense of cotton cultivation.
433 Any failure to carry out the State's purchasing plans correctly
248 then, will "undermine the prestige of the party and of state policies, encourage spontaneous capitalist tendencies among the peasants, and throw State plans into confusion." (Survey of China Mainland Press. No. 971. Supplement, January 19, 1955. "Make Accurate Estimates of Cotton Output and Fix Purchase Quotas.") Since the publication of this article on estimating cotton output and fixing purchase quotas, Peking has encouraged the "three fix policy" which is a measure designed to overcome food and agricultural raw material shortages in order to meet the planned targets set by the State. This policy provides for every administrative body throughout China to fix the production, fix the purchase of output, and fix the marketing of this output for the agricultural sectors of the Chinese economy. Undoubtedly this policy has been rigorously applied to the Northwest. Information is not available, however, as to whether the "three fix policy" has solved the above problems.

4. Kansu

668 The Communists have made strenuous efforts to restore Kansu
185 to its former prosperity (in the days of the old Silk Road to Europe Kansu was a fertile and prosperous region). The plan to build Lanchow, the capital, into an industrial base safely removed from the seacoast, the opening of the Lanchow-Sinkiang Railway, and the extensive geological surveys for minerals and oil, indicate recent attempts to do this. On March 14, 1956, Deputy K'o Shih-king reported on the province's five year plan. Only information pertaining to agricultural progress and policy will be considered.

668 The total output of grain and cotton in 1956 will be 10,350 million
185 catties (207 million bushels) and 250,000 piculs (16,662 tons)
433 respectively, representing 124.42 per cent (or 6,882,750 tons of
[241] grain) and 281.87 per cent of the quotas set for 1957 in the first
[313] five year plan. Afforestation will be carried out over an area of 5,300,000 mou (806,061 acres). (Union Research Service. Vol. 3, No. 3, April 10, 1956. p. 40.)

185 A comparison of Communist output figures with those of the
433 pre-Communist period is difficult. Since we cannot consider
[114] wheat only as grain (grain in this case would include corn, barley, millet, etc.) We possess no figures for oil seed bearing crops
[248] for 1956. However, for cotton, where Communist resources have been invested to expand cotton production and output, the 1956 figure of 16,662 tons as compared with the 1941 high of 3,712 tons represents around a fourfold increase.

668 The Chinese Communists predict that the vast areas of waste-
185 land in Kansu will be transformed into cotton fields soon. Ex-
248 perts have been experimenting, it is reported, to select the most
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*668 suitable cotton strains for sowing and the best methods of irrigation
• 185 for the large-scale cultivation of cotton in the province. 17,000
248 hectares (42,907 acres) are now being surveyed in the Kansu cor-
311 ridor and the vast plains along the Yellow River in Northwest China for future establishment of mechanized state farms. Altogether, the corridor and the plain are estimated to have over 650,000 hectares (1,616,150 acres) of wasteland. In 1954, it was found that the greater part of 200,000 hectares (494,200 acres) of wasteland surveyed was suitable for cotton; three new mechanized state farms have been set up so far there.

*668 Some of the information available on agricultural policy in Kansu
241 deals with the area around Lanchow, where there is some suburban
369 farming, and the development of cooperatives in the Wu-chung Hui Nationality Autonomous Chou of Kansu Province (from a speech by Ma Teng-ai delivered on July 22, 1955, to the National People's Congress). Discussion of these areas will not give us a complete picture of the progress or difficulties in agricultural development but they will indicate the trend of agriculture in Kansu.

[565] In Lanchow, it was reported that the landlord class and "feudal"
[423] exploitation of the peasants in the suburban areas had been abolished. 15,112 mou (2,297 acres) of land had been confiscated and distributed among 20,400 peasants who possessed no land or very little. Production and livelihood materials were also distributed among
*668 these peasants. So far, seven vegetable and agricultural pro-
241 ducer co-ops and 606 mutual aid teams are in existence in the
404 suburban areas. These included roughly 32.46 per cent of the
369 peasant households; expanding agr cultural production to meet the
[476] daily growing needs for vegetables in the city has been stressed. By fall of 1956 it is planned to have eighty-three per cent of all agricultural rural households in the suburbs, in agricultural producer co-ops. Two socialist vegetable producer co-ops will be established. Future emphasis will be on the expansion of vegetable farms, orchards, and development of poultry and pig rearing.

*668 The city of Lanchow has grown greatly in the past five years
241 with the influx of troops, technicians, laborers, and their families.
369 It is questionable whether agriculture in the surrounding areas can have maintained this population growth. This would imply that some food would need to have been shipped from China.

[404] There have been some difficulties in developing co-ops and mutual
[476] aid teams, as in other parts of the Northwest. Planned purchases
[443] and marketing of food, extremely critical in this neighborhood since the urban life of Lanchow rests upon these marketing procedures, have not been carried off successfuly and have slowed up cooperativization. There has been evidence of bureaucratization, lack of class responsibility toward the poor and middle peasants, and a lack of serious study and investigation of conditions.

*668 563 474 476 185 In the Wu-chung Autonomous Chou, in Kansu, Hui and Han groups live together. Today there are 277 agricultural producer co-ops, eighty nine for the Hui and 124 for the Han. More than 3,200 mutual aid teams have been developedp 1,200 are permanent. Future policy stresses increased agricultural production by cooperativization. In a speech delivered by Ma Teng-ai to the National People's Congress however, key emphasis was placed on the correct implementation of solidifying the poor and middle class peasants and following the principle of allowing the peasants of various nationalities to enter the co-ops voluntarily. Such a desire to enter must result from the mutual benefit they feel they would receive. When agricultural producer co-ops are to be formed, namely, consolidating the various permanent mutual aid teams and pooling land, farm implements, etc. special attention is to be given the customs, habits, and religious beliefs of the different nationalities. For instance, if the Hui and Han members of the same cooperative do not want to use the same well, different wells are to be drilled, and used separately. If hogs are raised in a cooperative, they may be attended by the Han members themselves and they are not considered an auxiliary occupation of the cooperative. The Chinese Communists, in dealing with the nationality problem in the Northwest, so far have tread very lightly whenever they wished to promote cooperativization. They have proceeded very slowly, using subtle methods of persuasion to urge the various nationalities to enlist their labor power in the mutual aid and produce co-ops.

*668 669 578 474 Communist administrators complain bitterly of counter-revolutionary activities in Kansu. In a speech by Su Chen-yung, Vice Director of Public Security Bureau, he states: "Counter-revolutionaries have unceasingly wages destructive activities against the Socialist transformation enterprises in both the cities and the countryside. With a view to impeding the work of the peasants joining the cooperatives, and to sabotaging agricultural production, they concentrated on certain reactionary landowners, wealthy peasants, and Taoist leaders to cheat some backward elements into establishing false cooperatives and even organizing uprisings." (Union Research Service. Vol. 3, p. 43.)

Su Chen-yung then gives as examples the disruption of progress in establishing agricultural cooperatives, the killing of Communist cadres, the burning of supply and marketing cooperatives storehouses, etc. Such admission by Communist officials of overt violence indicates that the Chinese Communists still are encountering peasant resistance, although nearly seven years have passed since their occupation of the region.

*668 24 474 185 C. Conclusion

The Chinese Communists have attempted to control closely

and coordinate all rural activities toward the fulfillment of Chinese Communist agrarian policy: complete cooperativization of agriculture and the assurance of a steady flow of food and raw materials through fixed purchase of produce. (The problem of agricultural taxes in the Northwest has not been mentioned so far, The Communists have not reported any reduction of agricultural taxes, or what the average tax rates in the Northwest are.) They have a system of cooperatives at the basic production levels. Though cooperativization has taken place slowly because of the peculiar conditions of many areas in the last six years, it is expected that once some nucleus of control has been established in the rural areas in the form of permanent mutual aid cooperatives and producer cooperatives, rapid cooperativization will take place, to embrace, ultimately, all rural inhabitants.

In the national minority area, the Chinese Communists have proceeded slowly, so far, in their attempts to organize agricultural and pastoral activities. The problem of different national minority groups has been one of the principal stumbling blocks in the creation of lower level co-ops, and will undoubtedly pose a barrier to rapid cooperativization.

Secondly, the State has been able to provide only a small supply of farm implements and credit. Shortages in China and the difficulties of transportation undoubtedly account for this. It is questionable whether these shortages can be overcome in the next few years, but when they are, new farm tools and sufficient credit should account for significant output increases.

Thirdly, one of the principal ways the Communists have attempted to increase output in the Northwest has been through extensive farming rather than through intensive means. They have done this by using vast amounts of labor, particularly military, to reclaim desert wastes, build irrigation works, and construct state farms to manage the reclaimed area. Evidence of this is most striking in Sinkiang and Kansu. Although Chinghai and Shensi with their hills and valleys limit extensive farming procedures, cultivation has been extended wherever possible. Because of the shortage of fertilizer and tools the Chinese Communists have been unable to promote intensive farming on a scale that would raise output per acre significantly. Instead, they have had to resort to expanding cultivation, that is, extensive farming, to obtain the desired increases.

Finally, it is clearly evident that in all parts of the Northwest, with the exception of Chinghai, there has been a general neglect in promoting livestock production and instead an all-out effort to increase the planting and extension of cultivation of wheat, cotton, and oil seed bearing crops. This program differs radically from policy measures suggested by Western agronomists, i.e., J.L. Buck and T.H. Shen who advocated the restoration of fertility to

Tsaidam basin and developing the economy and culture of the national minorities.

Up to the beginning of 1956, the railway mileage in the Northwest region was increased to roughly 1800 kilometers from some 600 kilometers prior to 1949.

Based on the above-mentioned data, new railway construction in this region may be tabulated as follows:

Railway Construction in Northwest China
1950-1955
in kilometers

Line	length planned	date started	date completed	to 1955	Total
T'ien-shui-Lanchou	346	1950	1952	346	
Lanchou-Sinkiang a	2,800	1952	- -	646	
Paoki-Chengtu b	700	1952	1956	485	
Lanchou-Paotow	1,000	1955	- -	- -	
Lanchou-Chinghai c	1,500	1956	- -	- -	
Total				1,477[e]	3660[d]

a. To the end of 1955.
b. Of the total 485 kms. only about 100 kms were in Shensi.
c. Newly projected route
d. Based on the table of "Construction of New Railways in Chinese Mainland, 1950-1955" in Communication section of General Handbook.
e. Of the 1477 kms. about 1100 kms. were built in the Northwest region.

As shown in the above table, about thirty per cent of the total of new railways was built in this Northwest area. As officially reported, Communist China has scheduled to spend, on transport and communication projects, over 140 million taels of gold (1 tael is equal to 1.1023 ounces) of investments totalling over 700 million taels in capital construction during the First Five Year Plan. ("A Great Plan" People's China, August 1, 1955, pp. 5-6.) It appears clear that a very large amount has been spent on railway construction in this region, though no breakdown figure can be located. With regard to railway building materials, the same source indicated that "after reconstruction of the factories, Anshan alone will produce enough rolled steel to meet the needs of the nation's locomotive-building works, shipyards and motor and tractor works throughout the first Five Year Plan and the early part of the second. Anshan's annual output of rails will be sufficient for the laying of more than 3000 kilometers." It should be noted that at least up to the beginning of the first Five Year Plan, most of the materials for railroad building had to be supplied by the Soviet Bloc, particularly Russia.

in understanding the long-run economic potential of this region, it is equally true that there must have been some other reasons forcing them to develop this remote region more swiftly than they might otherwise have done, investing in it sizable amounts of much needed capital backed by considerable forced labor. Other factors, both internal and external, should therefore be taken into consideration. In the first place, Communist China had made a tremendous effort to shift the center of its gravity from the coastal regions into these relatively empty lands bordering Soviet central Asia, perhaps partly as a result of the United Nations embargo and the Korean War. Secondly, the forced pace of development in the Northwest might be partly a defense measure. During the War in Korea it became clear how vulnerable Manchuria was to bombing attacks. Had the United Nations chosen to do so, most of Manchuria's industrial complexes could have been destroyed. But in the Northwest, factories, railways and mines were far safer than anywhere else in China. Moreover, this area would assure maximum secrecy for projects which Red China and Russia were reported to have been jointly undertaking. ("I Saw Communist China" by Robert Guillain in the Saturday Evening Post, June 2, 1956. p. 114.)

Following on the heels of the railway construction work, a huge oil refinery at Lanchou was built. It is also reported that between Lanchou and the site of the refinery, a road was constructed more than twice as wide as Fifth Avenue in New York city, and a large hill thickly covered with houses was completely leveled to make the road straight. At Lanchou the railway yard under construction contained fifty kms. of tracks, with modern equipment such as turntables, grain silos, refrigerating plants and the like, all brought from Russia. Along the wide road, the beginning of what is called New Lanchou has arisen. In Sinkiang, a new city was born in Urumchi, where giant factories have been built, including the Sinkiang Non-ferrous Metals Co., the Sinkiang Petroleum Co., the Sinkiang "August 1st" Iron and Steel Plant, the Sinkiang Machinery Plant, the October Motor Car Repair and Assembly Shop, the Urumchi Automatic Electric Plant, and the like. This accomplishment in industrial construction and future plans of industrial development are indeed very much tied up with communications development.

Communist China may very well focus its principal attention on the Northwest during the period of its second Five Year Plan scheduled to begin in 1958, just as the first Five Year Plan concentrated on the Northeast. The Northwest might then play a major rôle in the economic relations between China and Russia, and be industrialized to a level comparable with Manchuria.

It may therefore be concluded that so long as there are both internal and external pressures, and the "lean-to-one-side"

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433 policy is enforced, further economic exploitation and construction may be carried out, and more rapid and deliberate development of communications may be forthcoming in this remote northwest area.

shops there, but must leave the central part of the city before dark- 563
ness sets in.

There had been a great deal of progress since my first visit to 651
the city in the spring of 1904. In the summer of 1905 the old, very 185
reactionary viceroy was replaced by one who had been in Berlin and
Petersburg. This man had sent Splingaert, the interpreter of Baron
von Richthofen, known to every Sinologist, /153/ in order to find
European engineers who should open up a new era for the province of
Kansu. He wanted to re-open the cloth factory, and build sugar and
champagne factories. The very good coal mines which lay a short [316]
day's journey south of the city were to be made more accessible by
means of a small railway. But above all, a university and technical
school were to be opened, and, for strategic purposes, an iron bridge
built across the Hwang Ho.

That was the program which everyone was discussing in this city
of no newspapers, but there were for the most part unbelievably ex-
aggerated and distorted rumors about it. Because a Chinese province
is an independent unit, the governor-general was obliged to raise a
large part of the funds which were necessary before he could carry
out his program. He therefore wanted to open up another mint in [436]
which special Kansu money was to be coined and the silver and gold
for this he wanted to get from the provincial government. He there- [316]
fore needed European foundry experts; prospects of mining conces-
sions for Europeans no longer existed here. But everyone knew that
there was gold as well as silver in Kansu; for Kansu, like Szechwan,
borders on Tibet and since ancient times gold has been washed in the
rivers on the border.

It was in connection with this very program that I came into fre- 574
quent contact with the higher officials during my three-weeks' stay 524
in Lanchow fu. I was often obliged to attend Chinese dinners at which
the Chinese are so fond of testing the drinking capacity of a foreigner.
Their drinking games are particularly dangerous, being a sort of
morra in which the loser must empty cups the size of a thimble,
filled with warmed whiskey. For linguistic reasons alone it is very
difficult for foreigners to win. But I found that the cultivated Chinese
and Manchu begins to warm up to a foreigner when the latter,
through this sort of thing, comes closer to him as a human being.
Thus I learned the game "dry" from one of my servants and in the
course of time I had many a "Chinese queue" on my conscience. I 574
was amazed to see how brief the emotional flare-ups of these people
were; or could they, perhaps, even if they had had too much of a